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Jan Forsman
Descartes on Will and Suspension 
of Judgment: Affectivity of the Reasons 
for Doubt
In this paper, I  join the so-called voluntarism debate on Descartes’s theory of will and 
judgment, arguing for an indirect doxastic voluntarism reading of Descartes, as opposed to 
a classic, or direct doxastic voluntarism. More specifically, I examine the question whether 
Descartes thinks the will can have a direct and full control over one’s suspension of judg-
ment. 
Descartes was a doxastic voluntarist, maintaining that the will has some kind of con-
trol over one’s doxastic states, such as belief and doubt (e.g. AT VII, 22 & 59–60; CSM 
II, 15 & 41).1 According to a long-held reading, the control that the will has over doxastic 
states in Descartes’s theory is direct; the doxastic states are affected by the mere act of will. 
This reading, called direct doxastic voluntarism (DDV) or direct voluntarism (DV) for 
short, states that we are capable of assenting, rejecting and suspending a judgment based 
only on our will to do so. Thus, these actions would be utterly and merely volitional. DV 
can be divided into two further positions, direct positive voluntarism (+DV) and direct 
negative voluntarism (-DV). Direct positive voluntarism deals with the act of forming 
judgments, maintaining that one can accept or deny a proposition wilfully and either 
merely believe or not believe something voluntarily. Direct negative voluntarism deals 
with the suspension of judgment, maintaining that it can likewise be accomplished by 
a simple act of will (cf. e.g. Newman 2008, 343; Vitz 2010, 107–108 & 2015a, 73–74; 
Schüssler 2013, 148–150).
However, I support an alternate account of Descartes’s voluntarism, which is called in-
direct doxastic voluntarism (IDV) or indirect voluntarism (IV) for short. By this account, 
the will is capable of affecting a doxastic state indirectly by making one concentrate on 
1  When referring to Descartes, I use the standard style of reference, where AT stands for the 12-volume 
edition of original texts by Adam and Tannery, CSM stands for the 2-volume English translations by 
Cottingham, Stoothoff and Murdoch, and CSMK stands for the translations of correspondence (in the 
third volume of the latter edition) by Cottingham, Stoothoff, Murdoch and Kenny.
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essential tasks for forming that state, such as gathering up and paying attention to strong 
reasons and evidence. IV is also possible to divide into indirect positive voluntarism (+IV) 
and indirect negative voluntarism (-IV). Per indirect positive voluntarism the will needs to 
pay attention to reasons for accepting or denying some proposition. Likewise, by indirect 
negative voluntarism, in order to suspend judgment the will needs to direct this attention 
to the reasons for doubt. By attending to these reasons, the will also comes face-to-face 
with its own freedom (AT VIII 6; CSM I, 194. Cf. AT VII, 57; CSM II, 40). This feel-
ing of freedom can be described as affectivity of the reasons for belief (assent) and doubt 
(suspension).
My main goal in this paper is to defend indirect voluntarism over direct voluntarism, 
especially concentrating on voluntarism concerning suspension of judgment (-IV). Even 
though indirect voluntarism has gained some attention in the literature (e.g. Kenny 1998; 
Cottingham 1988 & 2002; Della Rocca 2006; Newman 2008), the systematic defense it 
deserves has not been attempted yet. My own reading is intended to fill this gap.2 I put 
forward three kinds of evidence for indirect voluntarism: 1) All the textual evidence that 
seems to support DV can just as easily be read to support IV. 2) IV is a philosophically 
and psychologically more convincing account of the judgment-forming process in humans 
than DV. 3) -IV is a more coherent and less conflicting reading of the general suspension 
of judgment by the Method of Doubt in the First Meditation.
The paper is divided into four parts. In Part 1, I  start with a  short introduction to 
Descartes’s account on judgments and beliefs and especially on the role of the will in 
forming them. In Parts 2 and 3, I  introduce direct and indirect voluntarism and bring 
forward the textual and non-textual evidence supporting them. Finally, in Part 4, I com-
pare Descartes’s theory of will and judgment with the suspension of judgment in the First 
Meditation, defending indirect (negative) voluntarism and laying out the evidence for my 
own reading.
2  However, DV does not need to hold that the will can directly suspend from judging or deny any propo-
sition. Many readings consider that clear and distinct perceptions are utterly irresistible for the will. 
When confronted by a clear and distinct perception, the will would always accept it. Cf. e.g. Frankfurt 
(2008, chapter 11), Kenny (1998, 150–159), Curley (1975, 177), Williams (2015, 165–167), Wilson 
(1978, chapter 3), Rosenthal (1986, 431), Newman (2008, 338–342) and Carriero (2009, chapter 4). 
However, Descartes’s stance on this is quite ambiguous (cf. especially the Letter to [Mesland], 9 Febru-
ary 1645: AT IV, 173–175; CSMK, 244–246). Because of this, not all commentators take the irresist-
ibility of clear and distinct perception at face value and some view Descartes as retaining the will’s 
independent power of choice even in these cases. Indeed, there’s an interesting debate going on in the 
current literature about this topic. Cf. esp. Alanen (2003, chapter 7; 2013), Newman (2008), Shapiro 
(2008), Carriero (2009, chapter 4), Schüssler (2013) and Wee (2014). Even though this debate is cer-
tainly important, in this paper I will mostly stick to the voluntarism debate on perceptions that are not 
clear and distinct. However, even when it comes to clear and distinct perception, Descartes seems to 
maintain IV: clear and distinct perception is evidence that is so strong that the will has no choice but 
to accept it. Despite this, Descartes seems to want to preserve the freedom to suspend judgment on 
them at least in an absolute or ideal sense (cf. Schüssler 2013, 163).
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1. Will in Descartes’s Theory of Judgment
To get a better understanding of Descartes’s doxastic voluntarism it is necessary to first lay 
out the role of the will as Descartes sees it. According to Descartes, thinking (cogitatio) 
is divided into two modes: perceptio (perception) and volitio (will). Descartes also calls 
perceptio understanding (intellectus). In the Principles of Philosophy (1644, henceforth the 
Principia) he further explains the topic as follows: 
All the modes of thinking that we experience within ourselves can be brought 
under two general headings: perception [perceptio], or the operation of the intel-
lect [operatio intellectus], and volition [volitio], or the operation of the will [operatio 
voluntatis]. Sensory perception, imagination and pure understanding are simply 
various modes of perception; desire, aversion, assertion, denial and doubt are vari-
ous modes of willing (Principia I, §XXXII: AT VIIIA, 17; CSM I, 204).
For Descartes then, the will is a faculty, moreover a free faculty: 
[T]he will simply consists in our ability to do [facere] or not to do [non facere] 
something (that is, to affirm or deny, to pursue or avoid); or rather, it consists 
simply of the fact that when the intellect puts something forward for affirmation 
or denial or for pursuit or avoidance, our inclinations are such that we do not feel 
we are determined by an external force”3 (Med. IV, 8.: AT VII, 57; CSM II, 40).4
Beliefs and opinions, on the other hand, are judgments. In the famous example of the 
Second Meditation, Descartes’s meditator examines first a piece of wax and then people 
walking outside the window:
We say that we see the wax itself, if it is there before us, not that we judge it to be 
there from its colour or shape; and this might lead me to conclude without more ado 
that knowledge of the wax comes from what the eye sees, and not from the scrutiny 
3  This quote is particularly relevant to another discussion on Descartes’s understanding of the will. Does 
Descartes follow earlier (direct) voluntarists like Duns Scotus, Occam and Suaréz and consider the 
will’s freedom to be essentially indifference (hence, the two-way power to do otherwise), like the first 
part of the quote suggests, or spontaneity (hence, being self-caused and undetermined by anything ex-
ternal), like the latter part suggests? See e.g. Ragland (2006), Alanen (2013), Schüssler (2013), Cunning 
(2014) and Wee (2014). I will mostly skip this discussion here. However, I view that Descartes holds 
both to be part of the will’s freedom. In the case of clear and distinct perceptions, the will experiences 
spontaneous freedom, as it feels strongly inclined towards them. When perception is not clear and 
distinct, one can reach a state of equilibrium related to the reasons for assent and non-assent. In such 
a state, the will experiences indifferent freedom, as neither side is stronger or more inclined than the 
other (AT VII, 22 & 57–58; CSM II, 15 & 40). 
4  When referring to Descartes’s work Meditations on First Philosophy (1641–1642, henceforth Medita-
tions) I also add the number of Meditation (Med.) and paragraph (p.) of the text I am referring to.
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of the mind alone. But then if I look out of the window and see men crossing the 
square, as I just happen to have done, I normally say that I see the men themselves, 
just as I say that I see the wax. Yet do I see any more than hats and coats which could 
conceal automatons? I judge that they are men. And so something which I thought 
I was seeing with my eyes is in fact grasped solely by the faculty of judgment which 
is in my mind (Med. II, 13.: AT VII, 32; CSM II, 21. Emphasis in the original).
This was clearly a difficult part for the authors of the Sixth Objections, and so Descartes had 
to explain it further in his Replies:
For example, when I see a stick […] rays of light are reflected off the stick and 
set up certain movements in the optic nerve, in the brain, as I have explained at 
some length in the Optics [1637]. This movement in the brain, which is common 
to us and the brutes, is the first grade of sensory response. This leads to the second 
grade, which extends to the mere perception of the colour and light reflected from 
the stick […] Nothing more that this should be referred to the sensory faculty, if 
we wish to distinguish it carefully from the intellect. But suppose that, as a result 
of being affected by this sensation of colour, I judge that a stick, located outside 
me, is coloured; and suppose that on the basis of the extension of the colour and its 
boundaries together with its position in relation to the parts of the brain, I make 
a rational calculation about the size, shape and distance of the stick; although such 
reasoning is commonly assigned to the senses (which is why I have here referred to 
the third grade of sensory response), it is clear that it depends solely on the intellect 
(AT VII, 437–438; CSM II, 295).
Descartes thus differentiates between sensing as a bodily function (first grade) and sens-
ing as a representation (second grade), viewing the latter as the mental part of sensation. 
Besides these, he further differentiates a third grade, which is related to the understanding, 
being judgments about the mental representation.
However, Descartes does not base judgment solely on understanding. In Notes on a Cer-
tain Broadsheet (1648), he heavily criticises Regius for dividing understanding into perceiv-
ing and judging.
I saw that over and above perception, which is a prerequisite of judgment, we need 
affirmation and negation to determine the form of the judgment, and also that we 
are often free to withhold our assent, even if we perceive the matter in question. 
Hence I assigned the act of judging itself, which consists simply in assenting (i.e. 
in affirmation or denial) to the determination of the will rather than to the percep-
tion of the intellect (AT VIIIB, 363; CSM I, 307).
Judgments are not mere acts of understanding but come about by the cooperation of un-
derstanding and the will. To be precise, making a judgment is an act of the will.
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Allow me to elucidate this with an example. When I happen to turn my attention from 
writing this paper and look outside the balcony window, I gain a sense impression of a tree 
growing next to the railway track. I see that the tree exists and that it has certain qualities, 
such as size, figure and the colour of its leaves (or that it is completely leafless, like now). 
My belief of the existence of the tree is a judgment, which is formed when a sense impres-
sion of a tree is conveyed to my understanding and I accept it to be real and existing by my 
will. Because my will is free and has the independent freedom of choice, I may voluntarily 
also deny said proposition as false (the tree does not exist) or alternatively suspend my judg-
ment on the existence of the tree altogether. If I for example consider that my perception 
of the tree is too dim and obscure, I can decline the judgment that the tree exists (it merely 
is a  telephone pole which I mistake for a  tree). Alternatively, if I  consider that I might 
presently only be dreaming of seeing a tree (and even of writing the paper, perhaps), I can 
wilfully suspend judgment on whether the tree exists or not. As Descartes describes in the 
Principia (I, §VI): “[W]e […] experience within us the kind of freedom [libertatem esse 
expirimur] which enables us always to refrain [abstinere] from believing things which are 
not completely certain and thoroughly examined. Hence we are able to take precautions 
against going wrong on any occasion” (AT VIII 6; CSM I, 194).5
Belief then follows from accepting or alternatively denying a  given proposition. It 
should also be noted that acceptance does not simply mean shrugging one’s shoulder re-
garding the proposition in question. Accepting a proposition conveyed to the understand-
ing means that one truly believes in it (cf. e.g. Williams 2015, 161). However, a question fol-
lows: if my beliefs come from judgments and my judgments are formed by my will, which 
for Descartes is free (no outside force can make me accept the existence of the tree), does 
this mean that according to Descartes I can wilfully believe whatever I want? Even if I very 
well knew I am not dreaming in this instance (say, I perform a test by pinching myself), 
can I nevertheless suspend my judgment on the tree’s existence? Better yet, to have an even 
more radical example, can I believe that there is a warm summer in Finland, even if all my 
senses tell me that it is winter?
2. Direct Voluntarism
Do I then have direct, easy and unproblematic voluntary access to my beliefs? Even so di-
rect, easy and unproblematic that I am capable of believing in any proposition I can think 
of? As an example, let’s say that I find the winter period in Finland completely hostile and 
in order to improve my mood, I decide to believe it is in fact summer. Even though all the 
5  For a more detailed description of the role of willing and judging in Descartes’s philosophy, see e.g. 
Kenny (1998), Rosenthal (1986), Della Rocca (2006), Newman (2008), Shapiro (2008), Kambouchner 
(2008) & Naaman-Zauderer (2010). Schüssler (2013) pays close attention to the role of doxastic vol-
untarism in late-scholastic discussions, especially among the Jesuits, which also motivated Descartes’s 
stance on the issue.
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evidence I can gather alludes to a freezing cold winter in Finland, can I nevertheless believe 
that it is summer?6
According to direct positive voluntarism, Descartes would answer affirmatively. My 
will has a direct, uncomplex relation to my doxastic states, and even though all the evi-
dence my understanding gathers points towards winter, my will has an independent ability 
to either accept or deny this proposition. If I end up denying the winter proposition, I can 
perform another direct act of the will to accept another, in this case the summer proposi-
tion. The evidence supporting this might not be as strong, but according to +DV my will 
has a direct and independent power to both accept and deny propositions, thus I can just 
as easily accept that it is summer (cf. Curley 1975; Grant 1976). 
Direct negative voluntarism works the same way for suspension of judgment. When the 
meditator states in the beginning of the First Meditation that earlier acquired knowledge is 
full of falsehoods and because of this decides to overthrow everything previously learned 
(Med I., 1.: AT VII, 17–18; CSM II, 12.), according to -DV, general overthrow of all opin-
ions would already follow from this mere decision. In this so-called provisional suspension 
of judgment, the meditator would suspend her judgment on earlier beliefs and opinions 
merely because she decides to suspend them. The resolution to overthrow all beliefs is al-
ready in itself the act of overthrowing. No further steps would be required. Suspension of 
judgment is utterly voluntary and one can suspend a judgment by merely deciding so. Be-
cause of this, the provisional suspension of judgment by which the First Meditation begins 
would be distinct from the following skeptical scenarios (madness, dream, deceiving God, 
origin by faith or chance, malicious demon). Suspension of judgment would then occur 
even before consideration of these scenarios (cf. Frankfurt 2008, 24–31).
This reading can be supported by the Fourth Meditation, where Descartes’s meditator 
states: “If […] I simply refrain from making a judgment in cases where I do not perceive the 
truth with sufficient clarity and distinctness, then it is clear that I am behaving correctly 
and avoiding error”. This seems to indicate complete affective control over our doxastic 
states and an ability to suspend judgment merely by an act of will. The same seems to be 
suggested by the comment of God-given “freedom to assent or not to assent” in those cases 
where there is no clear and distinct perception (Med. IV, 12. & 15.: AT VII, 59–61; CSM 
II, 41–42). Another way to support the reading is to look at the use of the Method of Doubt. 
In the First Meditation, the meditator concludes that “[I]n [the] future I must withhold 
my assent from these former beliefs just as carefully as I would from obvious falsehoods, 
if I want to discover any certainty”. Later on, she adds: “In view of this, I think it will be 
a good plan to turn my will in completely the opposite direction and deceive myself, by 
pretending for a time that these former opinions are utterly false and imaginary” (Med. I, 
10–11.: AT VII, 21–22; CSM II, 15. Cf. e.g. Della Rocca 2006, 148; Newman 2008, 344). 
Likewise, in the letter to Clerselier (12 January 1646), Descartes states:
6  The inspiration for this example comes from an article by Brian Grant titled “Descartes, Belief and the 
Will” (1976).
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[S]ince making or not making a judgment is an act of will [action de la volonté] 
[…] it is evident that it is something in our power. For, in order to get rid of every 
kind of preconceived opinion, all we need to do is resolve not to affirm or deny [ne 
rien assurer ou nier] anything which we have previously affirmed or denied until 
we have examined it afresh (AT IXA, 204; CSM II, 270).7 
Based on these remarks, many commentators have taken the will to have a direct effect on 
the suspension of judgment. For instance, Janet Broughton considers Descartes as meaning 
that “it is here and now within my power to suspend judgment about the truth of anything 
I believed” (Broughton 2002, 58). Harry G. Frankfurt likewise views that the suspension 
of judgment “results directly from a decision or an act of will”. A person suspends judgment 
merely by resolving that his judgments are suspended (Frankfurt 2008, 25). Even Michael 
Della Rocca, though inclining more towards indirect voluntarism, agrees that “[d]irect 
control is what Descartes’ talk in Meditation IV of ‘the freedom to assent or not to assent’ 
most naturally suggests…” (Della Rocca 2006, 148).8
It is useful to notice that this view of Descartes’s theory of judgment and will is upheld 
not only by contemporary scholars. Already in the Fifth Objections, Gassendi asks: “[W]hy 
did you not make a simple and brief statement to the effect that you were regarding your 
previous knowledge as uncertain so that you could later single out what you found to be 
true?” (AT VII, 257; CSM II, 180). In other words, if suspending judgment is indeed this 
easy, why doesn’t Descartes simply state the suspension without further decorum? Why 
should one even bother with the skeptical scenarios when the suspension can be accom-
plished directly, with a single strike of the will?
Descartes however denies Gassendi’s statement that the suspension can be accom-
plished in a superficial way:
Is it really so easy to free ourselves from all the errors which we have soaked up 
since our infancy? Can we really be too careful in carrying out a project which 
everyone agrees should be performed? But not doubt you wanted to point out that 
7  This letter, and the “Author’s and Translator’s notes concerning the Fifth Set of Objections” (Avertisse-
ment de l’auteur touchant les cinquièmes objections & Avertissement du traducteur touchant les cinquièmes 
objections) preceding it, were published as part of the first edition of the Meditations’s translation into 
French (1647). The letter along with the author’s note are translated in CSM as the Appendix to the Fifth 
Set of Objections and Replies.
8  Other readings supporting +DV have been offered by e.g. Wilson (1978, 144–146), Williams (2015, 
161–163) and less evidently MacArthur (2003, 166). In recent literature, Vitz (2010; 2015a, chapter 
6) has most prominently defended -DV. Schüssler on the other hand views Descartes holding both 
direct and indirect (negative) voluntarism. When it comes to clear and distinct perception, Descartes 
is on the side of -IV (though is keen on preserving the possibility of direct suspension of judgment, at 
least ideally). With perceptions that are not clear and distinct Descartes would hold -DV, except with 
entrenched and habitual opinions, which can only be dislodged indirectly (Schüssler 2013, 173). My 
reading differs from Schüssler in that I view Descartes holding indirect voluntarism for both habitual/
deeply ingrained and newly made fresh beliefs.
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most people, although verbally admitting that we should escape from precon-
ceived opinions, never do so in fact, because they do not spend any care or effort 
on the task… (AT VII, 348; CSM II, 242).
Yet this does not have to be a problem for -DV. Frankfurt emphasises the following ex-
ample when defending reading of the suspension of judgment as “an uncomplicated act of 
will” (Frankfurt 2008, 26): Mr. X decides to stop smoking at noon of the 1st of January. 
This is an uncomplicated act of will, which can be done very easily by Mr. X. Yet, based 
only on this, can we say that Mr. X really did stop smoking at noon of the 1st of January? 
If Mr. X smoked a cigarette at 12:30 of the same day, the answer would obviously be no. 
But if by the end of December the next year Mr. X had not smoked one cigarette, we could 
be able to say yes – Mr. X did indeed stop smoking. Frankfurt sees the meditator to be 
in a similar position to Mr. X. She can make the decision to suspend her judgment on all 
beliefs (and by Frankfurt’s account, this decision is something she can do very easily and 
without effort), but if she would immediately go to accept another belief, she wouldn’t have 
suspended her judgment after all (Frankfurt 2008, 29–30).
This example can be supported by the Objections and Replies. In the already mentioned 
letter to Clerselier Descartes comments: 
[N]o matter how much we have resolved to assert or deny anything, we easily for-
get our resolution afterwards if we have not strongly impressed it on our memory 
[fortement imprimée en sa memoire]; and this is why I suggested that we should 
think about it very carefully [pensait avec soin] (AT IXA, 204; CSM II, 270). 
This seems to also be implied by the following comment at the end of the Fourth Medita-
tion: 
[E]ven if I have no power to avoid error in the first way […], which requires a clear 
perception of everything I have to deliberate on, I can avoid error in the second 
way, which depends merely on my remembering [recorder] to withhold judgment 
on any occasion when the truth of the matter is not clear. Admittedly, I am aware 
of a certain weakness in me, in that I am unable to keep my attention fixed on one 
and the same item of knowledge at all time; but by attentive and repeated medita-
tion I am nevertheless able to make myself remember it as often as the need arises, 
and thus get into the habit of avoiding error (Med. IV, 16.: AT VII, 61–62; CSM 
II, 43. Emphasis added). 
The skeptical scenarios then do help with the suspension of judgment, but only by rein-
forcing the resolution to suspend judgment and thus helping to steer clear of forming new 
beliefs (cf. Frankfurt 2008, 29–30; Broughton 2002, 58). I will henceforth be referring to 
this as the memory-argument. 
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Frankfurt also suggests that the Seventh Objections and Replies provides another sup-
portive paragraph for his reading:
Suppose he [Bourdin, the author of the Seventh Objections] had a basket full of 
apples and, being worried that some of the apples were rotten, wanted to take out 
the rotten ones to prevent the rot spreading. How would he proceed? Would he 
not begin by tipping [rejiceret] the whole lot out of the basket? And would not the 
next step to be to cast his eye over each apple in turn, and pick up and put back in 
the basket only those he saw to be sound, leaving the others? In just the same way, 
those who have never philosophized correctly have various opinions in the minds 
which they have begun to store up since childhood, and which they therefore have 
reason to believe may in many cases be false (AT VII, 481; CSM II, 324).
This basket-of-apples analogy suggests that Descartes’s project of overthrowing his opinions 
has two phases. In Phase 1, the “basket” is tipped over and judgment is suspended on all 
earlier beliefs. In Phase 2, the earlier beliefs are closely examined to see which of them 
can be reinstated. According to Frankfurt, the skeptical scenarios would belong to Phase 
2, being used to examine the earlier beliefs and opinions. If doubt can be cast, e.g. on the 
reliability of sensory perceptions, this belief would not be reinstated but left suspended. By 
Frankfurt’s account, this analogy suggests that “emptying one’s mind is a rather headlong 
and indiscriminate affair”, while evaluating the former opinions requires careful argumen-
tation (Frankfurt 2008, 27–28). Suspension of judgment would therefore be an easy task 
and could be done with a simple and direct act of willing the suspension.9 
3. Indirect Voluntarism
Is the act of the will truly this simple? If I now used all of my energy for wanting it to be 
summer in Finland instead of winter, would my belief actually change? No matter how 
much I try, I don’t seem to be able to affect my belief in winter in any way. To be sure, 
I don’t even know what mental apparatus to use. Should I imagine daisies? By imagining 
daisies, I might momentarily come to the conclusion it is now summer, the sun is shining 
and the grass outside is blooming with daisies. But once my thoughts get distracted, or if 
I just happen to look outside the window, I once again can only assert: “By Plato’s beard, 
it’s a cold winter!”. If the directly voluntaristic reading is accurate, Descartes seems to hold 
a view that is quite problematic both philosophically and psychologically.
9  Broughton also views that the meditator can suspend her judgment merely by deciding to not accept 
or deny, and that the only obstacle for this action lies in the difficulty of remembering the resolution, 
instead of in any difficulty or inability while trying it (Broughton 2002, 58). However, she disagrees 
with Frankfurt that suspension of judgment would occur before considering the skeptical scenarios 
(ibid, 55, note 20). More on this below, in note 15.
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However, it seems that DV simplifies Descartes’s account in an unwarranted way. In-
deed, the opposing theory, indirect voluntarism, has in recent discussions gained growing 
support.10 IV denies directly voluntaristic affective control over doxastic states and views 
this to be indirect. The will can affect belief-forming in a mediate or indirect way by affect-
ing the essential tasks required for forming doxastic states, such as directing the attention 
towards additional evidence for the desired state – to be more precise, by attending to the 
reasons to assent or suspend. Per indirect positive voluntarism, accepting a proposition re-
quires one to attend to the reasons for accepting, while denying that proposition requires 
one to attend to the reasons for denying it. Likewise, per indirect negative voluntarism, 
doubting the proposition at hand requires one to attend to the reasons for doubt (reasons 
that question said proposition), while suspension of judgment requires one also to attend to 
the reasons for suspending judgment (cf. e.g. Newman 2008, 343; Vitz 2010, 107–108 & 
2015a, 73–74; Schüssler 2013). By considering these reasons, one likewise gets to feel the 
freedom of will, thus feeling the affectivity of the reasons for making a free choice.
Like direct voluntaristic readings, readings supporting IV can refer to both the use of 
the Method of Doubt in the First Meditation and to the role of the will in the Fourth. Right 
at the beginning of the First Meditation, the meditator agrees to the following maxim: 
I should hold back my assent from opinions which are not completely certain and 
indubitable [indubitata] just as carefully as I do from those which are patently 
false. So for the purpose of casting aside [rejiciendas] all my opinions, it will be 
enough to find in each of them at least some reason for doubt [rationem dubitandi] 
(Med. I, 2.: AT VII, 18; CSM II, 12. Emphasis added. Translation altered).11
Descartes then argues that to suspend judgment, the meditator first requires reasons for 
doubt. These reasons are provided by the different skeptical scenarios, which the medita-
tor ponders in the First Meditation and which make her question her earlier beliefs. For 
example, finding particular sense perception occasionally deceiving does not yet make the 
meditator become convinced that the senses are generally not trustable for concluding that 
I am here sitting by the fire, writing on this piece of paper (or in the balcony, writing on 
my laptop) (Med. I, 4.: AT VII, 18; CSM II, 12–13). The same applies to every opinion one 
suspends. After the meditator has stated that “in future I must withhold my assent from 
these former beliefs just as carefully as I would from obvious falsehoods” and that to suc-
ceed in this it is a “a good plan” to turn one’s will in the opposite direction completely, and 
10  Commentators supporting IV include e.g. Kenny (1998), Cottingham (1988; 2002), Della Rocca 
(2006, 149), Newman (2008, 343–346), Perin (2008, 60–62), Carriero (2009, 262–263), Naaman-
Zauderer (2010, 120) and possibly Rosenthal (1986, 411). Even Curley notes that perhaps Descartes is 
not quite the direct voluntarist he seems, but does not take the thought further (Curley 1975, 176).
11  CSM translates rejiciendas as “rejecting”. However, it is not a conjugation of the word rejectio but of 
the verb rejicere, which literally translates as “throwing back”. Descartes uses the same term with the 
basket-of-apples analogy, referring to removing apples from a basket (ex corbe rejiceret), where he is not 
talking of complete rejection of the apples. The meaning of the word seems indeed to be less strong than 
rejection would implicate. I have thus opted for translating it as “casting aside”.
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deceive oneself to pretend those opinions are utterly false, Descartes immediately comes 
up with another skeptical scenario (the malicious demon) by which the meditator could 
succeed in this self-deception (Med. I, 11–12.: AT VII, 22; CSM II, 15).
Descartes also emphasises the reasons for doubt in two other instances. In an unfin-
ished dialogue, The Search for Truth (henceforth the Search), one of the debating characters 
(Epistemon)12 states: “But you are not ignorant of the fact that the opinions first received 
in our imagination remain so deeply imprinted [imprimées] there that our will cannot erase 
[effacer] them on its own, but can do so only by calling on the assistance of powerful reasons 
[puissantes raisons]” (AT X, 509: CSM II, 406. Emphasis added). In the letter to Clerselier, 
Descartes also comments:
Nevertheless, I did say that there was some difficulty in expelling from our belief 
everything we have previously accepted. One reason for this is that before we can 
decide to doubt we need some reason for doubting [raison de douter] and that is why 
in my First Meditation I put forward the principal reasons for doubt [les principales] 
(AT IXA, 204; CSM II, 270. Emphasis added).
Descartes then clearly holds that one requires strong reasons to suspend judgment and 
likewise to doubt. Therefore, the skeptical scenarios precede the suspension of judgment, 
because the former is a necessary requirement for the latter.13 As the reply to Gassendi also 
indicates, Descartes denies the ease of suspending judgment and holds that suspension 
requires more than a solitary act of the will. This also indicates Descartes holding indirect 
effect on the doxastic states (cf. Della Rocca 2006, 149; Newman 2008, 344; Cottingham 
1988).
The Fourth Meditation can likewise be read as support for IV. In stating “[i]f I  […] 
simply refrain from making a judgment in cases where I do not perceive the truth with 
sufficient clarity and distinctness, then it is clear that I am behaving correctly and avoiding 
error”, Descartes would mean that in such cases our responsibility is to concentrate and at-
tend to the reasons for doubt and suspension. Similarly, the statement of God having given 
us “the freedom to assent or not to assent” to perceptions is not in contradiction with IV. 
God could have given us such an ability, without that ability being a direct act of the will 
(Med. IV, 12. & 15.: AT VII, 59–61; CSM II, 41–42).
It is important then to notice that every textual evidence which seems to support DV 
can just as easily be read as supporting IV. However, this is clearly not yet sufficient for 
12  In the dialogue, Epistemon (gr. ἐπιστημων, ‘knowledgeable’) represents a spokesperson for scholasti-
cism and for this reason does not generally present opinions which Descartes himself holds. However, 
there are reasons to view Descartes as agreeing with this statement. I return to these reasons in Part 4.
13  However, the skeptical scenarios – that is to say the reasons for doubt – do not by themselves suffice as 
reasons for suspending judgment. Suspension of judgment similarly requires a reasoning, which is not 
constituted by the reasons for doubt. I might find some reason to doubt the landing on the moon to 
have taken place (perhaps, it was a hoax) but this by itself does not yet make me suspend my judgment 
on whether man has been to the moon. Despite this, for the suspension to succeed, it requires the aid 
of the reasons for doubt. For this, see also Perin (2008).
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establishing indirect voluntarism as the better and stronger interpretation. Indeed, some 
commentators step outside the text, asking what kind of position Descartes should be hold-
ing as an intelligent philosopher (e.g. Newman 2008, 345–346). In other words, they ask 
what would be a philosophically and psychologically convincing account of our ability to 
accept, deny or suspend judgment.
As the earlier example of winter in Finland demonstrates, evidence does not seem par-
ticularly strong for DV. Instead, there are strong reasons to consider it a psychologically 
problematic position. Direct voluntary acts simply don’t seem to have much to do with my 
beliefs or opinions. Most commentators supporting a directly positive voluntaristic read-
ing of Descartes also admit this. Williams comments that “if this is what assent is, it is far 
from clear how assenting is even dependent on the will, let alone a mode of it”, asking: “are 
there not a very large number of things that one just cannot believe, and others that one 
cannot help believing?” (Williams 2015, 161). Wilson adds that this sort of view on the 
role of the will seems questionable since “of course we can’t just decide to believe or assent 
to something, and forthwith believe or assent to it”. This, as she states, can also be discov-
ered phenomenologically (Wilson 1978, 145). Broughton likewise considers direct negative 
voluntarism as “false to the psychology of human intellectual activity”, maintaining that 
the meditator “can no more suspend judgment by willing to do so than [s]he can believe by 
willing to do so” (Broughton 2002, 59). However, each of the above commentators reads 
Descartes’s theory of judgment and will as directly (positively or negatively) voluntaristic. 
If DV is so philosophically unconvincing and psychologically problematic, wouldn’t this 
also speak for IV? At least this would be the case, if we were to presume that Descartes 
is aiming towards a theory which is as convincing as possible, both philosophically and 
psychologically.14
Thus far, I have argued for indirect voluntarism being a better reading than direct vol-
untarism for two reasons: 1) Texts that support DV can just as well be read as supporting 
IV; and 2) IV is both philosophically and psychologically more convincing an account 
of our ability to accept, deny and suspend judgment. However, these reasons do not yet 
tip the scales for IV. Merely observing the textual evidence as supporting both sides does 
not validate one over the other. Similarly, referring to an account that Descartes should be 
holding does not mean that he actually holds it. Newman (2008, 345) especially builds on 
Descartes’s intelligence, arguing that we should not be too hasty in putting a problematic 
theory like DV into his mouth. However, as Schüssler (2013, 172) has also pointed out, 
if evidence for DV can be found in Descartes’s texts, Newman’s argument does not hold. 
Thus, in the next part, I will be demonstrating what I call a ‘knock-out argument’ for why 
indirect (negative) voluntarism is a better reading than direct (negative) voluntarism: -IV is 
a more coherent and less self-contradictory reading of the general suspension of judgment 
in the First Meditation than -DV. 
14  However, DV might not in fact be as impossible a position as it has sometimes been portrayed. Cf. esp. 
Vitz 2015a, appendix & 2015b. 
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4.  Will and Suspension of Judgment in the 
First Meditation
In Part 2, I went through the way in which a supporter of -DV can read the suspension of 
judgment in the First Meditation. Suspension of judgment occurs effortlessly, with a simple 
act of the will – the decision to suspend is the act of suspension itself and the only related 
difficulty comes from remembering this decision (the so-called memory-argument) (cf. 
Frankfurt 2008, 29–30; Broughton 2002, 58).15 This account is usually defended by the 
Letter to Clerselier and by the end of the Fourth Meditation. The end of the First Meditation 
seems to also support this: “But it is not enough merely to have noticed this; I must make 
an effort to remember [recorder] it” (Med. I, 11.: AT VII, 22; CSM II, 15). Other suggested 
evidence for this reading includes the basket-of-apples analogy, which would make the 
general overthrow of opinions to have two phases, the skeptical scenarios constituting the 
second phase (cf. Frankfurt 2008, 27–28).
However, this account is problematic in that it leaves us with a great deal of incoher-
ence on Descartes’s part.16 First, it suggests the suspension of judgment to be far easier 
than Descartes himself describes it to be. In fact, Descartes goes to great lengths to em-
phasise how difficult and unnatural this general overthrow of opinions actually is. Note for 
example the comment at the beginning of the First Meditation: “But the task looked an 
enormous one, and I began to wait until I should reach a mature enough age to ensure that 
no subsequent time of life would be more suitable for tackling such inquiries” (Med. I, 1.: 
AT VII, 17; CSM II, 12). The difficulty of the task is already implied in this comment on 
its enormity – why would the meditator otherwise have to wait for a “mature enough age” 
that would be more suitable for engaging in the inquiry. At the end of the First Meditation, 
she also describes its result as an “arduous [laboriosum] undertaking” (Med. I, 12.: AT VII, 
23; CSM II, 15).
In his reply to Gassendi, Descartes likewise questions the idea of the ease to free 
ourselves from preconceived opinions and common-sense experience. He also empha-
sises the required effort for the suspension of preconceived opinions in here as well: 
“But no doubt you wanted to point out that most people, although verbally admitting 
that we should escape from preconceived opinion, never do so in fact, because they do 
not spend any care and effort [studium aut laborem] on the task” (AT VII, 348; CSM II, 
242. Emphasis added). Based on these comments, it seems when discussing suspension 
15  It should be noted though that Broughton disagrees with Frankfurt on the issue of Descartes employ-
ing suspension of judgment for the meditator before she has considered the skeptical scenarios (Brough-
ton 2002, 55, note 20). However, since Broughton also sides with -DV, it is not clear why the meditator 
could (would) not suspend on judgment merely by willing so, especially since she considers suspension 
to be in one’s power “here and now” (ibid, 58). Broughton acknowledges some of the difficulties for her 
position (ibid, 58–59).
16  It is to be noted that Frankfurt is fully aware of this, bringing up some textual problems for his reading 
(ibid, 25–31).
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of judgment,  Descartes has in mind something else than a simple and easy act of the 
will.
However, a proponent of DV does not have to commit to the ease of an act of the will. 
That voluntariness is difficult does not mean that it cannot be direct. Therefore, referring 
to the difficulty of suspension is not enough for a convincing argument against -DV.17 Let’s 
then return to the reasoning behind indirect (negative) voluntarism. In the Search (through 
the mouth of Epistemon), Descartes dictates that the will is not enough to overthrow the 
earlier opinions on its own and needs the assistance of “powerful reasons” (AT X 509; 
CSM II, 406). It is true that Epistemon, who in the dialogue represents Aristotelian scho-
lastics (and who can therefore be justifiably seen as holding “the opinions first received” 
coming from the senses), does not generally represent Descartes’s own stand on matters.18 
However, Eudoxus19, who in the dialogue is almost purely Descartes’s alter ego, does not 
challenge the view, but instead goes on to provide these reasons (though not to Epistemon 
but to the third character in the discussion, Polyandros)20 (AT X, 509; CSM II, 406–407). 
This last paragraph demonstrates well why the overthrow is so difficult. To be able to over-
throw one’s preconceived opinions, one has to have powerful reasons for the overthrow. 
Descartes then unequivocally denies that an act of the will would in itself be enough for 
the suspension. 
The second incoherence in -DV comes from the order of the suspension of judgment 
and the skeptical scenarios. Descartes’s own account becomes very clear in the Letter to 
Clerselier: 
[S]ince making or not making a judgment is an act of will (as I have explained 
in the appropriate place) it is evident that it is something in our power. For, after 
all, in order to get rid of every kind of preconceived opinion, all we need to do is 
resolve not to affirm or deny anything which we have previously affirmed or denied 
until we have examined it afresh. But this does not entail that we cease to retain 
all the same notions in our memory. Nevertheless, I did say that there was some 
difficulty in expelling from our belief everything we have previously accepted. 
One reason for this is that before we can decide to doubt, we need some reason for 
doubting; and that is why [c’est pourquoy] in my First Meditation I put forward the 
17  Many of the proponents for -DV clearly do imply easiness (e.g. Frankfurt 2008 & Broughton 2002). 
This, however, is not necessary.
18  The scholastic status of Epistemon can be questioned by referring to the many other viewpoints during 
Descartes’s time (e.g. atomism and materialism) which Descartes likewise wanted to overturn. How-
ever, Epistemon is described as having “a detailed knowledge of everything that can be learned in the 
Schools [escholes]”, apparently referencing the scholastic school-system (AT X, 499; CSM II, 401). Thus, 
it is justifiable to consider Epistemon as the spokesperson for Aristotelian scholasticism.
19  Eudoxus (gr. ἐυδοξος, ‘famous’ or ‘one of good belief ’) represents an enlightened Cartesian philosopher 
in the dialogue and speaks for Descartes’s own views.
20  Polyandros (gr. πολυανδρός, from πολυς ἀνήρ, ‘everyman’) represents a person who lacks tutoring but 
has untutored common sense and by this, according to Descartes, is more embracing of the overthrow 
of earlier opinions than someone with an Aristotelian education.
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principal reasons for doubt. Another reason is that no matter how much we have 
resolved not to assert or deny anything, we easily forget our resolution afterwards 
if we have not strongly impressed it on our memory; and this is why [c’est pourquoy] 
I suggested that we should think about it very carefully (AT IXA, 204; CSM II, 
270. Emphasis added).
The reason why Descartes presents the meditator with the skeptical scenarios in the First 
Meditation is that in order to be able to suspend judgment, one first requires reasons for 
doubt. As Descartes clearly places the skeptical scenarios before the suspension of judgment, 
it would be incoherent on his part if the suspension of judgment occurred before them, 
as a distinct act. Frankfurt views this to be a mistake on Descartes’s part, claiming him 
to be confusing the two phases of his project as explained by the basket-of-apples analogy 
(Frankfurt 2008, 26 & 30–31). This is unconvincing to me for two reasons. First, it is 
insufficient to explain all the consequent incoherence in Descartes’s writings. Second, and 
more importantly, the basket-of-apples analogy is not related to the discussion in the First 
Meditation. It is a reply to Bourdin’s objection to the Second.
After concluding in the Second Meditation that she exists (Med. II, 3.), the medita-
tor goes on to consider what she is (Med. II, 4–5). First of all, she ponders on what 
she previously thought she was before beginning the project to overthrow her opinions: 
“What then did I formerly think I was? A human [hominem]” (AT VII, 25; CSM II, 17. 
Translation altered).21 Here Bourdin objects and asks if Descartes isn’t now referring to 
something that was already found to be false. How can one refer to things which were 
already rejected and overthrown from the mind? (AT VII, 479; CSM II, 323.) The basket-
of-apples analogy would be Descartes’s reply to this objection: to examine preconceived 
conceptions it is necessary to tip the “basket” and go through what is in it one by one. 
However, turning the basket over does not mean throwing the apples away. Instead, they 
stay on the side for a later inspection (AT VII, 481–482; CSM II, 324).22 In other words, 
the second phase of the ‘two-phase project’ happens in fact in the Second Meditation, as 
the meditator begins to examine her previous sense-based (Aristotelian) conceptions of 
herself and the world. The first phase, the general overthrow of opinions, happens in the 
First Meditation and there is no reason to assume its occurrence distinctly from the skepti-
cal scenarios. These paragraphs seem to provide enough evidence for preferring a reading 
that views the suspension of judgment as coming after the skeptical scenarios, as a result 
of them.
In the beginning of the First Meditation (Med. I, 1.), Descartes has the meditator un-
equivocally devote herself to the “general overthrow [eversio] of [her] opinions” (AT VII, 
21  CSM translates hominem as “a man”. As I refer to the meditator with the female pronoun, I have opted 
for the more literal translation “human”.
22  This is likewise supported by Descartes’s comment to Clerselier: “But this does not entail that we cease 
to retain all the same notions in our memory [sinon aprés (…) quoy qu’on ne laisse pas pour cela de retenir 
toutes les mesmes notions en sa memoire]” (AT IXA, 204; CSM II, 270).
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18; CSM II, 12. Translation altered).23 But the overthrow itself does not happen here – the 
commitment here is merely preliminary.24 It is a dedication to the effort required for the 
overthrow. This general overthrow of opinions requires careful attention and consider-
able mental effort, which the meditator must promise to adhere to. If the meditator was 
like Gassendi, acknowledging the need for the suspension but not taking the skeptical 
scenarios seriously, according to Descartes she would not be able to genuinely suspend her 
judgment.25 Suspension of judgment requires commitment that is serious (sincere) and free 
(without reservation) (seriò tandem & libere). As the next paragraph demonstrates, this 
commitment requires one to concentrate on the reasons for doubt (rationes dubitandorum) 
(AT VII, 17–18; CSM II, 12).26
What about the memory-argument? According to it, suspension of judgment is direct, 
accomplished by a simple act of the will. However, since the decision to suspend is difficult 
to recall, skeptical scenarios are needed for the suspension to be properly and enduringly 
possible. Thus, the scenarios help with the suspension. When armed with the memory 
argument, -DV seems to check both of the required boxes: suspension of judgment is men-
tally difficult, and the skeptical scenarios are a requirement for it. Merely referring to the 
insufficiency of the will alone or to the suspension resulting from the skeptical scenarios is 
not enough to respond to its challenge for -IV.
But why would it be so difficult for the meditator to remember her earlier decision? If 
the suspension of judgment comes from a simple act of the will, it is not easy to explain why 
it would be difficult to recall this. Take for example the case of Mr. X quitting smoking. 
Mr. X quits smoking with a single mental act and decides at the same time never to smoke 
another cigarette again. According to a proponent of direct voluntarism, why would this 
decision be so difficult to recall? It seems doubtful that neither Mr. X nor the meditator 
would be a person with especially poor mnemonic abilities. (If Mr. X happens to be a per-
son with an especially bad memory, the analogy does not really work.) Descartes makes 
it clear that the suspension of judgment is generally difficult for humans psychologically. 
However, nowhere else does he seem to consider memory to be the stumbling block of the 
human psyche.27
23  CSM translates eversio as “demolition”. However, I consider demolition to be misleading, as I don’t see 
the doubt as rejecting the former beliefs. For this, see note 11. Thus, I find the more fitting translation 
to be “overthrow”.
24  Cf. the Discourse on the Method, where the call to abandon all prior opinions comes in Part Two, but 
the radical doubt itself does not follow until Part Four (AT VI, 13–15 & 31–31; CSM II, 116–118 & 
126–127). See also Broughton 2002, 5, note 7.
25  Cf. the Fifth Objections and Replies (AT VII, 257–258 & 348–351; CSM II, 180 & 241–243).
26  My reading therefore follows the tradition of seeing the Meditations as a mental exercise. Cf. esp. Alquié 
(1950, 176), Gilson (1951, 186), Gueroult (1953, 39, note 16), Gouhier (1978, 110–112) & Frankfurt 
(2008, 20). Recent literature emphasising this aspect include e.g. Schüssler (2013, 172) & Vitz (2015a, 
chapter 2). 
27  Cf. esp. the Conversation with Burman (ATV, 148; CSMK, 334).
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Let’s take a closer look at the evidence for the memory-argument. In the Fourth Medita-
tion, the meditator declares: 
[E]ven if I have no power to avoid error in the first way just mentioned, which re-
quires a clear perception of everything I have to deliberate on, I can avoid error in 
the second way, which depends merely on my remembering to withhold judgment 
on any occasion when the truth of the matter is not clear. Admittedly, I am aware 
of a certain weakness in me, in that I am unable to keep my attention fixed on one 
and the same item of knowledge at all times [ut non possim semper uni & eidem 
cognitioni defixuss inhaerere]; but by attentive and repeated meditation [attentâ & 
fraepius iteratâ meditatione] I am nevertheless able to make myself remember it as 
often as the need arises, and thus get into the habit of avoiding error (Med. IV, 16.: 
AT VII, 61–62; CSM II, 43. Emphasis added).
According to Descartes then, remembering the decision is difficult because the attention 
span of the mind is restricted. The mind’s grasp of the meditation easily loosens and for 
this reason the suspension is difficult to retain. Suspension of judgment is therefore tempo-
rarily restricted. However, when the meditation is replicated often enough with sufficient 
attention, one becomes more competent in the suspension and it can be accomplished for 
longer periods of time. This also becomes clear at the end of the First Meditation (Med. I, 
11.):
But it is not enough merely to have noticed this; I must make an effort to remem-
ber it. My habitual opinions [constuetae opiniones] keep coming back, and, despite 
my wishes, they capture my belief, which is as it were bound over to them as a result 
of long occupation and the law of custom [longo usu & familiritatis]. […] In view of 
this, I think it will be a good plan to turn my will in completely the opposite di-
rection and deceive myself, by pretending for a time these former opinions are ut-
terly false and imaginary. I shall do this until the weight of preconceived opinion 
is counter-balanced and the distorting influence of habit no longer prevents my 
judgement from perceiving things correctly (AT VII, 22; CSM II, 15. Emphasis 
added).
The difficulty to remember is not because of the memory itself but rather the mind’s natu-
ral propensity for believing in habitual opinions (e.g. that sensory perception is reliable). 
It is not easy to diverge from this inclination (and the inclination is in a sense justifiable), 
and for this reason the mind’s grip from the suspension slackens. Suspension of judgment 
is cumbersome, not because it is difficult to remember, but because it is mentally laborious. 
For this same reason, it is also difficult to retain in memory. Recalling the suspension is 
then specifically paying attention to the reasons for doubt against the reasons for belief. By 
doing so, the vitality of the suspension is recalled and one can once again vigorously con-
centrate on it, while also being faced with the affectivity of the will’s freedom. This is also 
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what Descartes means in the Letter to Clerselier by impressing the resolution not to affirm 
or deny anything strongly on memory (AT IXA, 204; CSM II, 270).
It is therefore crucial to note that the memory-argument in no way contradicts -IV. 
Instead, -DV seems to lead Descartes inescapably to incoherence and self-contradiction. 
I maintain then that the burden of proof lies with the supporters of -DV. If Descartes con-
siders that the suspension of judgment is executed with a simple act of will, and the only 
difficulty therein lies in remembering, why would the suspension come about only after 
consideration of the skeptical scenarios, resulting from them?28
5. Conclusion
I have presented three kinds of evidence for indirect voluntarism in this paper: 1) All 
textual evidence for direct voluntarism can just as easily be interpreted for indirect vol-
untarism; 2) indirect voluntarism is a more convincing reading both philosophically and 
psychologically; and, what I consider the ‘knock-out argument’, 3) indirect negative vol-
untarism is a more coherent and less self-contradictory reading of the First Meditation and 
the suspension of judgment therein.
By this account, even Descartes does not argue that I can just decide to believe it to be 
summer, when all the evidence suggests winter. However, the situation can be different if 
I can find some evidence that it might be summer (say, even though there is snow on the 
ground and -12 degrees, my calendar informs me that it is in fact June), or at least some 
evidence that it might not be winter (and a reason to suspend my judgment on it being 
winter). In such a case, my will can deny the winter-proposition and affirm the summer-
proposition, or at least suspend the belief in winter, while noticing the feeling of its own 
freedom. Therefore, it seems that those commentators reading Descartes’s judgment theory 
as directly voluntaristic have in their criticisms – if I may borrow a colloquial phrase – been 
barking up the wrong tree.29
To suspend judgment on the existence of the tree, I need something more than just will 
and the motivation for suspension. I also need to find reasons to consider my experience 
of the tree to be in some way in error or disconnected from the way the reality truly is 
28  It should be noted though that perhaps not all criticism on Descartes’s theory of judgment and will is 
undue. After all, Descartes clearly is a doxastic voluntarist and views the will to have at least some kind 
of control over our doxastic states, be as it may that it is indirect. It is anything but clear whether volun-
tariness has something to do with our beliefs or suspension of them, a point that many commentators 
have likewise paid attention to (e.g. Curley 1975, 173–174; Della Rocca 2006, 149). The topic is still 
hotly debated (see for instance Shah 2002 & Vitz 2015b), though it may be that Descartes is at error 
here. However, in any case his voluntaristic theory is not as psychologically problematic as most other 
readings have suggested.
29  Vitz likewise finds the critique of direct voluntarism in Descartes as unjustified, but for different rea-
sons. According to him, this criticism has only been directed towards +DV and not -DV (Vitz 2010; 
2015a, chapter 6 & appendix). In this paper, I have pointed out problems for -DV as well. 
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(e.g. I might be dreaming or deceived by a malicious demon), and a reason to suspend my 
judgment. In this sense, suspension of judgment as a mental act is not comparable to the 
act of quitting smoking. The decision to suspend judgment may be easy to make, but actual 
success is the result of arduous and attentive meditative practice, and even then, one can 
suspend judgment only temporarily.
The challenging nature of the suspension of judgment alludes also to another intrinsic 
aspect of the Method of Doubt. As Descartes describes the suspension to be arduous and 
difficult, it suggests that we should read him as being completely serious about the general 
suspension of judgment.30 Based on this, the use of the method is not a purely hypothetical 
mind game. Descartes truly means that we should suspend judgment on all of our opinions 
and beliefs, as difficult as this may be. Suspension of judgment is therefore meant to be 
psychologically real and genuine31.32
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